We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental threeplayer contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending effort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower effort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the determinants of group formation and its consequences for e¤orts and success in a con ‡ict framework of competition between a group of players (an 'alliance') and an opponent. Which characteristics determine whether a player enters into an alliance or prefers to stand alone in an upcoming contest? How does the process of alliance formation a¤ect contest behavior and what are the implications of alliance formation on the players' e¤ort contributions and payo¤s? Our paper provides answers to these questions and o¤ers insights that are useful for the institutional design in situations where rewards are allocated on the basis of relative performance.
For anecdotal evidence on possible answers to the questions outlined we can resort to classic …ction. In his drama Wilhelm Tell, Friedrich Schiller (1804) describes the formation of an alliance as well as the conscious decision to abstain from joining an alliance, both for good economic reasons. First, the drama features the famous "Rütli-Oath" in which three men unite forces in an alliance to …ght against tyranny. It refers to the legend according to which three cantons formed a confederation that developed into what is Switzerland today. Their oath is their mutual promise to act collectively and to jointly pursue a common interest, making reference to a common history and family roots ("Yet are we but one race, born of one blood, And all are children of one common home"). This indirectly hints at a recognition of the general problem of moral hazard in teams and appeals to the role of group spirit and in-group favoritism for overcoming the moral hazard problem. Second, as the bene…ts of alliance formation can be asymmetric, we may expect that players who would contribute a disproportionately large share in the alliance prefer to stand alone. Wilhelm Tell himself, the protagonist of the drama, behaves according to this principle. When Stau¤acher argues that "even the weak grow strong by union", Tell counters the argument by claiming: "But the strong man is the strongest when alone", and refuses to join the alliance.
Our framework builds on tournament theory where the reward scheme depends on relative performance. Tournaments or contests are frequently used in organizations to incentivize and motivate employees; the seminal paper on tournaments in labor markets is Lazear and Rosen (1981) . It analyzes exogenously given tournament structures; one process that determines the tournament structure is the possibility of alliance formation. In many sectors, team formation in the workplace has become increasingly popular. 1 Moreover, the competition with other individuals or teams, such as in the context of sales or product development teams, can have an important e¤ect on group cohesion and the incentive problem within the team. If several players form a team, this group formation adds a problem of moral hazard in teams to the tournament: an individual member's e¤ort bene…ts all members of his group. This positive externality has received considerable attention (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966, Holmstrom 1982) . If the group competes with an out-group, an individual member's e¤ort also has a negative externality as it harms members of the competing group. These externalities and the collective action problem make it di¢ cult to explain why alliances are formed voluntarily. Economists recognized the formation of an alliance as a puzzle. In order to explain the formation of alliances they resorted to technological bene…ts of …ghting in an alliance (Skaperdas 1998, Kovenock and Roberson 2012) , while political scientists explain alliance formation with deterrence e¤ects and balancing behavior (Gulick 1955 , Morgenthau 1963 , Waltz 1979 , Sorokin 1994 ) as a means to avoid violent con ‡ict or to end it more quickly. As indicated by psychologists, the existence of an out-group can have an important e¤ect on the emergence of in-group solidarity. Members of a group may develop a 'feeling to belong' to a group and their behavior may show in-group favoritism and spiteful attitudes towards the out-group. 2 These motivations exist even if individuals are exogenously grouped together.
Allowing individuals to choose whether or not to form a team can a¤ect the strength of the 'feeling to belong' and may have an impact on the individuals' contributions to team e¤ort. It also generates selection e¤ects. For instance, students are often allowed to submit their homework in groups. However, when forming such study groups and deciding on their own contribution, they have to take into account what the other students' willingness to form groups might tell them about their characteristics. Just as the example of Wilhelm Tell suggests, such selection e¤ects together with the implications on individual choices and group cohesion are salient features of alliance formation in contests. We analyze moral hazard in groups and self-selection into alliances in a controlled laboratory experiment in which players choose whether or not to enter into an alliance and how much e¤ort to expend in the contest with an out-group. The framework that we have chosen can be considered the generic framework to study alliance formation in the theory of con ‡ict. Three players compete for a prize of a given size according to the rules of a Tullock (1980) contest, which is a frequently analyzed type of tournament. 3 Prior to this competi-tion, two of these players are given the opportunity to join forces and form an alliance. 4 We focus on the implications of an alliance being an association that is based on a conscious voluntary choice, compared to a framework in which the alliance is exogenously imposed. In a purely consequentialist approach with symmetric players who are exclusively concerned with their monetary payo¤s, the actual procedure that leads to an alliance cannot make a di¤erence. However, procedures can matter, and voluntary alliance formation, compared to exogenously imposed alliance play, may make a di¤erence. If players care for aspects other than monetary payo¤s, voluntary choice for or against an alliance can induce selection effects. This may drive players' expectations about what types of players they are likely to be matched with if they choose to enter into an alliance, and what e¤orts their co-players would expend. Moreover, the procedural aspect and the active commitment to …ght jointly may induce behavioral e¤ects. It may strengthen the 'feeling to belong'if the alliance is the outcome of a voluntary choice, compared to exogenously formed alliances; this group spirit may induce stronger in-group favoritism. Again, this may be anticipated and consequently in ‡uence selection and cause behavioral reactions by other players.
To identify and isolate these potential e¤ects we compare interaction in a contest across treatments with exogenous alliances and endogenous alliances where the outside option is stand-alone play and where the out-group is always represented by one further player. We track an individual's behavior in environments in which the individual does not have a choice, but has to act as alliance player and stand-alone player, respectively. The e¤ort choices in these "NO CHOICE " contests can then be related to their preferences on whether to form an alliance or to stand alone. Moreover, the data on exogenous alliances provide the benchmark against which we compare the behavior of endogenously formed alliances.
Some of the key …ndings are as follows: Voluntary formation of an alliance is a frequent outcome, even in situations in which players pay to enter into an alliance. Strong players, however, have a preference for acting as stand-alone players, where "strong players" are players who are committed to expend high e¤ort due to, for instance, a higher subjective value of winning the contest. Because of the public good nature of individual contributions to alliance e¤ort, strong players are "exploited" by their alliance partner when entering into an alliance. Moreover, those "strong players" get a higher expected payo¤ in the stand-alone contest. This explains their preference for standing alone and is much in line with Wilhelm Tell's point of view. We also …nd that alliances which emerge from a voluntary choice of the players mobilize signi…cantly more contest e¤ort than exogenously formed alliances. The moral hazard in teams is weakened if team formation is an endogenous process.
Empirically, alliances and their formation and resolution in con ‡icts have been studied by political scientists in the …eld of international relations, using the ATOP (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project) and the COW (Correlates of War) data sets. 5 Precise answers on the questions we address are di¢ cult to extract from these data for a number of reasons. First, each international con ‡ict has a number of idiosyncratic aspects. Moreover, international con ‡ict typically does not emerge as a singular event, but is embedded in a speci…c historical context. Often, a con ‡ict cannot be understood or interpreted without reference to preceding con ‡ict. Within experimental economics, there is a growing literature that studies contests as well as the interaction of contestants in groups against groups or against individuals, where the groups are exogenously imposed on subjects (see, e.g., Nalbantian Dechenaux et al. 2012 ). 6 In a complex, dynamic experiment, Smith et al. (2012) analyze the impact of group formation on e¢ ciency "in anarchy" where subjects can invest in production, expropriation and defense. Cherry et al. (2013) study the e¤ects of investment cost, group size and group formation on contributions to a group public good in a framework where contributions reduce total output available. They …nd that individuals tend to vote for the socially optimal group size, which is determined by the trade-o¤ between the e¤ects of individual investment on group e¤ort and on total output. Choices to form groups have also been analyzed by Benenson et al. (2009) wherein coalition formation with up to two …ctional opponents changes the (exogenously determined) probability of winning a prize. They …nd that relative power matters for coalition formation and that coalitions are more often formed with opponents called "friends". We are not aware of any other experimental group contest in which groups form endogenously and which is used to study the e¤ect of endogenizing group formation as well as the question of which type of player self-selects into the alliance and which type prefers to stand alone. 7 While the role of endogeneity for the moral hazard problem is seemingly unexplored in experimental contests, endogenous group formation has attracted attention in a di¤erent area of economic experiments: public goods games. The …rst paper on endogenous group formation in a public goods experiment is Ehrhart and Keser (1999) , followed by a large number of recent contributions to this …eld. A focus of these studies has been on the impact of di¤erent institutional rules and mechanisms on the resulting group size and level of contributions, for instance, the role of entry and exit rules (Ahn et al. 2008 (Keser and Montmarquette 2011) . Being interested in the stability of the groups formed or the selection of conditional cooperators into the groups, all of these experiments use …xed partner matching. Our contribution to this literature is to study group formation and contributions to a group-speci…c public good in the presence of an opponent out-group. This feature may have an important e¤ect on individual behavior, even in our random matching design, that is, in the absence of repeated interaction.
Our experiment is also related to the literature on in-group favoritism, which emanated from social psychology (Sherif et al. 1961 , Brewer 1979 ). In our contest framework of competition with an out-group, group coherence and group spirit might be stronger if players self-select into the alliance. This phenomenon of in-group bias, or group solidarity, and its implications on economic outcomes have been analyzed and documented in a variety of di¤erent economic interactions: for instance, prisoner's dilemma and battle of the sexes (Charness et al. 2007 ), minimum e¤ort games (Chen and Chen 2011), dictator and response games (Chen and Li 2009 ), market experiments (Li et al. 2011 ) and investment decisions (Sutter 2009 ). 8 Most …ndings in this literature support the emergence of in-group solidarity in social interactions, especially if group membership is made salient. Our experimental contest varies the salience of group membership by either exogenously imposing group formation onto subjects or allowing subjects to voluntarily form groups.
2 Theoretical and experimental framework
Theoretical framework
Alliance formation and contest behavior are analyzed in two versions of a two-stage game with three players A, B, and C. In the …rst stage, a decision will be made about whether players A and B act in an alliance or as stand-alone players; the two versions di¤er in whether this decision is made exogenously (NO CHOICE environment) or endogenously (CHOICE environment), as described below. In the second stage, the three players interact in a contest: Here, each player i 2 fA; B; Cg chooses an e¤ort x i 0 that involves a cost which is equal to the e¤ort itself. Depending on whether or not players A and B are in an alliance in the subgame in stage 2, this subgame is a contest between the alliance of players A and B and the out-group player C (the "2-1" contest) or a symmetric three-player Tullock (1980) lottery contest (the "1-1-1" contest). In the "2-1" contest, the probability that the alliance of A and B wins is equal to the share of x A + x B in total e¤ort x A + x B + x C . In the "1-1-1" contest, a player i's probability of winning is equal to the share of his own e¤ort x i in total e¤ort
The equilibrium predictions for both subgames are given in Appendix A.1. If A and B form an alliance, their joint equilibrium e¤ort in the subsequent "2-1" contest is only half of what they would jointly expend in a three-player stand-alone contest (the "1-1-1" contest); moreover, in equilibrium, the joint win probability for A and B in "2-1" is lower than in "1-1-1". However, the reduction from three to two contesting parties reduces the intensity of the con ‡ict, and the lower e¤ort costs just counterbalance the e¤ect of the free-riding problem that an alliance faces. Overall, the expected monetary payo¤ for the alliance of A and B in the "2-1" contest is exactly the same as what A and B together would get in the "1-1-1" contest. The out-group player C is better o¤ in the "2-1" contest than in the "1-1-1" contest, but in the game considered he does not make a decision about which contest is played and is not our main focus of interest.
Our main research question compares exogenous alliances (NO CHOICE environment) to endogenously formed alliances (CHOICE environment). If the "2-1" subgame is reached, behavior within this subgame does not depend on the process that leads to the respective subgame, provided that players are motivated by their monetary payo¤s only. In this case, the theoretical benchmark suggests: whether alliances are formed endogenously or exogenously is irrelevant for the players'behavior in the contest subgame. Additional motivations might, however, cause the process of alliance formation to have an impact on the equilibrium outcome in the contest subgame, and we will discuss potential e¤ects after presenting the experimental design.
Experimental treatments
The "NO CHOICE " treatment serves as a baseline, and one interaction (round) proceeds as follows. In the …rst stage, the computer determines whether players A, B, and C interact in a contest that follows the rules of the "1-1-1" contest as described in the theory section or whether A and B are teamed up in an alliance, leading to a contest interaction that follows the rules of the "2-1" contest. The subjects learn about this outcome and enter into stage 2 where all subjects simultaneously choose their contest e¤ort as a nonnegative integer. The winner prize is V = 450 tokens; the loser prize is zero. Subjects pay as many tokens as they have chosen as their "e¤ort", irrespective of winning or losing. After all subjects in the group of three have chosen their e¤orts, they are shown the e¤ort choices of all players in their group and a "fortune wheel" that determines the winning party. 9 At the end of each round, subjects are displayed their own realized payo¤ from that round. Subjects participated in 15 independent and structurally identical interactions of this type where the "2-1" contest was selected in 10 out of the 15 rounds and the "1-1-1" contest was played in the remaining 5 rounds. The order of these contests was randomly chosen but was the same for all sessions. After each interaction, the subjects were randomly rematched. The second treatment is the "CHOICE " treatment, which di¤ers from the NO CHOICE treatment in only one aspect: the decision process in stage 1 that either leads to the formation of an alliance (subgame "2-1") or to stand-alone play by all players (subgame "1-1-1"). In the CHOICE treatment, players A and B are …rst asked independently and simultaneously whether they would like to form an alliance or to stand alone. If A and B both choose "1-1-1" or both choose "2-1", the subgame chosen is played. If A and B express diverging preferences, they are matched into an alliance with probability 1=2 and stand alone otherwise. 10 At the beginning of stage 2, the decisions of players A and B are displayed to all three players A, B, and C within a group. The subgame reached ("2-1" or "1-1-1") follows exactly the same rules as in the NO CHOICE treatment. Like the NO CHOICE treatment, the CHOICE treatment consists of 15 independent interactions with random rematching of subjects in Figure 1 is replaced by a random device which selects the subgame.) All subjects participated in 15 rounds of the NO CHOICE treatment and 15 rounds of the CHOICE treatment, keeping their role as player A, B, or C throughout all 30 rounds. For half of the sessions, subjects started with the NO CHOICE treatment, followed by the CHOICE treatment; for the other half of the sessions, the order of NO CHOICE and CHOICE was reversed. 12 
Experimental procedures
To each of the computerized experimental sessions we typically admitted 18 subjects who were randomly assigned a …xed role ("player A", "player B", or "player C") at the beginning of the experiment. Then, the subjects were divided into groups of three players (consisting of one player of each role) and interacted exactly once before they were randomly regrouped, keeping their role as player A, B or C. Although not having explicitly been stated in the experimental instructions, for the random matching we randomly divided the participants of a session into matching groups of 9 subjects in order to avoid dependencies between all observations of one session. Each subject had to go through the two treatments CHOICE and NO CHOICE outlined above.
The theory section revealed an indi¤erence of players A and B between the choice of "1-1-1" and "2-1" if all players are motivated by monetary incentives only and assuming that alliance players play the symmetric equilibrium in the "2-1" contest. To break this indeterminacy, we introduced a small monetary incentive for the choice between the two subgames: In about one half of the sessions, players A and B each had to pay 5 tokens whenever the "2-1" contest was played; in the other half of the sessions, A and B each had to pay 5 tokens whenever the "1-1-1" contest was played. This small monetary incentive (5 tokens compared to the prize of 450 tokens) helps to ensure that players carefully consider their choice between the two games. The payment had to be made both in the CHOICE and in the NO CHOICE treatment, and it had to be made by both players A and B, irrespective of their own choice. 13 Hence, the variations in terms of sequence of play (NO CHOICE …rst or CHOICE …rst) and the small payment attached to one of the subgames (paying 5 tokens either for "2-1" or for "1-1-1") led to four di¤erent types of sessions, each consisting of the CHOICE and the NO CHOICE treatment. Each subject participated in exactly one of the four session types. 14 The experiment took place at the University of Munich and was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 ). Overall, we conducted 17 sessions (3-5 sessions per session type) with a total of 231 subjects, mainly students. 15 To ensure that subjects properly understood the rules of the game, they had to answer a set of pre-experimental questions. 16 After having completed the respective rounds of both the CHOICE and the NO CHOICE treatments, subjects answered a set of postexperimental questions and took part in an incentivized one-shot prisoner's dilemma. Finally, each subject was paid separately and in private. A participant's payment consisted of (i) a EUR 4 show-up fee, (ii) his/her earnings in the prisoner's dilemma, (iii) a payment of EUR 0.60 for each of the 30 rounds (which essentially served as their endowment in the contest), and (iv) the pro…ts (possibly negative) earned in 6 randomly selected rounds of the experiment. 17 The exchange rate used in all sessions was 45 tokens = EUR 1, that is, the value of the prize in a round selected for payment was equal to EUR 10. A session took about one and a half hours, and subjects earned an average of EUR 24 (with a standard deviation of EUR 10, a minimum of EUR 0 and a maximum of EUR 52.50) plus the show-up fee.
Main predictions
The fundamental question that motivates our analysis is on the determinants of alliance formation and alliance success. What explains a player's choice to form an alliance? What are the implications of self-selection into alliances for alliance success? To what degree does the ability of alliances to mobilize joint e¤ort depend on the individuals'decision to form an alliance, compared to a situation where the alliance is formed by nature?
The main hypothesis that we want to test with the experimental data is motivated by a rational choice perspective on alliances: Average alliance e¤ort is not a¤ected by the process of alliance formation.
Hypothesis 1
In the "2-1" contest of the alliance AB against the single player C, the average e¤ort of an alliance player is the same in exogenously formed alliances and in voluntarily formed alliances.
If individuals are homogeneous and maximize their monetary payo¤s, the data obtained in the experiment should provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1: Average alliance e¤ort should be the same in the NO CHOICE treatment and the CHOICE treatment. 18 There are, however, several e¤ects that could cause e¤ort to be dependent on the process of alliance formation. First, there could be a psychological e¤ect of a conscious choice to form an alliance that is absent in the model outlined in appendix A.1. Being together in a voluntarily formed alliance may induce higher in-group solidarity, leading to a higher willingness to expend e¤ort in order to increase the joint prospect of victory. Given the considerable evidence on in-group favoritism, the role that competing out-groups play for the behavior of players inside a group and the importance of building a group identity for in-group behavior, we would expect behavior that systematically deviates from the irrelevance result summarized in Hypothesis 1.
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Second, there may be a correlation between individual-speci…c characterisitics -especially a player's willingness to expend e¤ort -and the individual propensity to form an alliance. 20 Thus, a di¤erence between e¤orts in endogenous and exogenous alliances (and hence a rejection of Hypothesis 1) may also be driven by a selection of certain types of players into alliances. Concentrating on the selection issue, we set up two mutually exclusive testable statements which summarize the two possibilities that might emerge:
Hypothesis 2 a) Individuals who typically expend more-than-average e¤ort are relatively more likely to enter into an alliance. b) Individuals who typically expend less-than-average e¤ort are relatively more likely to enter into an alliance.
If (some) players derive a non-monetary utility from winning and if this causes e¤ort choices to be higher (Sheremeta 2010b ), then players who are particularly keen on winning might choose to form an alliance because they expect their probability of winning to be higher in alliances. 21 This would make players who typically expend higher-than-average e¤ort more likely to form alliances (Hypothesis 2a), and self-selection of such "strong players" (in terms of their e¤ort choice) would lead to higher e¤orts in endogenous alliances. On the other hand, players who usually expend higher-than-average e¤ort bear a larger share of the cost of alliance e¤ort and therefore have a lower monetary payo¤ than their co-player in the alliance. These "strong players" might want to stay away from forming an alliance in order to avoid being "exploited" by their co-player. The subsample of players in endogenously formed alliances would then be made up of individuals who typically expend less-than-average e¤ort (Hypothesis 2b), and the self-selection of players investing relatively little would make endogenously formed alliances less successful, compared to exogenously given alliances.
Finally, if individual e¤ort is (positively or negatively) correlated with the individual preference for alliance formation, then players may take the other player's choice of alliance formation into account to update their beliefs about this player's type. The anticipation of the co-player's behavior may have an impact on the own e¤ort choice. This might cause e¤ort in voluntarily formed alliances to be di¤erent from e¤ort in exogenously formed alliances, wherein individuals cannot form beliefs about their co-player's type from stage 1 choices. Such strategic reactions to the co-player's decision on alliance formation will crucially depend on the evidence on Hypothesis 2.
In total, given these hypotheses, endogenous alliance formation may potentially evoke e¤ects that work in opposite directions. Our data allow us to analyze the determinants of a player's choice to form an alliance and therefore to draw conclusions on the self-selection e¤ect. In particular, to test the statements summarized in Hypothesis 2, we can examine the impact of an individual's average e¤ort in the NO CHOICE treatment on this individual's decision for or against alliance formation in the CHOICE treatment. Here, average e¤ort in the NO CHOICE treatment is used as a proxy for the e¤ort that "the individual typically expends" in situations where this e¤ort choice cannot be a¤ected by the process of alliance formation.
In addition, with the data generated by the experiment, we can analyze various further questions on the behavior of players in voluntarily chosen three-player contests (the "1-1-1" contest), on the behavior of the single player C (including a possible reaction of the single player C to the nature of alliance formation, as the alliance players' choices on alliance formation are made common knowledge), and on the overall e¤ect for contest outcomes.
Results
Our main hypothesis addresses the impact of alliance formation on contest behavior, comparing voluntarily formed to randomly formed alliances (CHOICE vs. NO CHOICE ). Figure 2 illustrates time series of average e¤ort by alliance players and stand-alone players in "2-1" contests. First of all, as known from other contest experiments, individuals expend more e¤ort than theoretically predicted. 22 This holds both for the alliance players and for the out-group player. 23 Moreover, Figure 2 shows that average e¤ort of players in voluntarily formed alliances is higher than average e¤ort in randomly, and thus exogenously, formed alliances. This treatment e¤ect of CHOICE is in contrast to the standard theory prediction 22 Explanations for overdissipation and a high variability in e¤orts include spite and inequality aversion (Herrmann and Orzen 2008), non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta 2010b ), risk preferences (Millner and Pratt 1991) , endowment e¤ects (Price and Sheremeta 2012), and mistakes (Potters et al. 1998 ). 23 For alliance players, this overdissipation is reduced in later rounds; hence, average e¤ort is lower in part 2 of the experiment, and this holds consistently for both treatments NO CHOICE and CHOICE. See also Table B .2 in the appendix, which summarizes average e¤ort of alliance players in the NO CHOICE and in the CHOICE treatment, depending on the order in which these two treatments have been played. in Hypothesis 1, and we will analyze this result in more detail below. 24 It is also worth mentioning that, despite the increase in mobilized e¤ort, voluntarily formed alliances are not more successful than exogenously formed alliances. Their probability of winning is almost the same in the CHOICE and in the NO CHOICE treatments (on average, 48:2% in CHOICE vs. 47:3% in NO CHOICE ). This is due to the higher average e¤ort of the stand-alone player when facing voluntarily formed alliances (CHOICE ) than when facing exogenously formed alliances (NO CHOICE ). Because of the greater amount of e¤ort expended, the monetary payo¤ of voluntarily formed alliances is lower than the payo¤ of randomly formed alliances (40:4 compared to 46:8).
Decisions on alliance formation
The di¤erence in e¤ort choices of voluntarily compared to randomly formed alliances can be caused by many factors; in particular, the observations for voluntarily formed alliances may not originate from the same sample of individuals as the observations for exogenously formed alliances. Instead, there may be several selection e¤ects at work. Hence, before we turn to the analysis of individual e¤ort choices, we examine the determinants of the choice of whether or not to form an alliance. Table 1 presents the results of random-e¤ects logistic regressions of a player A or B's decision to form an alliance, v it . 25 The dependent variable is equal to 1 if, in round t, player i 2 fA; Bg chooses to form an alliance and 0 otherwise. 26 For all estimations in Table 1 , the vector of explanatory variables contains two dummy variables that control for the di¤erent session types we run: the variable "C-NC" indicates that the CHOICE treatment was played …rst and the dummy "PAY2-1" is equal to 1 whenever players A and B had to make a small payment in case the "2-1" contest was played. 27 While the order of play does not signi…cantly a¤ect decisions on alliance formation, the probability of a vote for alliance formation is signi…cantly lower whenever the small fee was applied to the "2-1" contest. To quantify the e¤ect of the payment in terms of probabilities, the overall share of players A and B who vote for the "2-1" contest is 62:6% when the payment had to be made for "1-1-1" and 49:3% when the payment was applied to "2-1" (focusing on rounds 6-15). The small monetary incentives for or against alliance formation have worked in the predicted way, but have left scope for individual-speci…c characteristics to explain the propensity to enter into an alliance.
A focus of our interest is on individual-speci…c characteristics that explain the decision to join an alliance. From Estimation (2) onwards, we include socioeconomic information from the exit questionnaire as control variables; yet none of these variables signi…cantly explain individual choices. 28 In addition, the vector of explanatory variables contains an individual's e¤ort levels in the contests of the NO CHOICE treatment in two di¤erent ways. First, (x i x A;B )
is an individual's average e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment, compared to the average e¤ort of all players A or B in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment. 29 Estimations (2) and (4) show that e¤ort levels in exogenously selected "1-1-1" contests signi…cantly in ‡uence the probability to vote for alliance formation. Players who typically contribute more than the average player A or B in 25 The reported results focus on experienced behavior (rounds 6-15) to reduce the impact of learning. Including observations from all rounds into the estimation does, however, not qualitatively a¤ect the results. 26 Note that this does not imply that the "2-1" contest is played in this round since the selection of the contest variant also depends on the choice of the potential alliance partner. 27 Recall that in half of the sessions the NO CHOICE treatment was played …rst and in the other half the order was reversed and that individual choices on alliance formation were incentivized by a small payment to be made for either the "2-1" or the "1-1-1" contest (each variant in about half of the sessions). 28 The included variables are age, gender, …eld of study, number of siblings, height, and action chosen in the incentivized prisoner's dilemma played at the end of the experiment. 29 This variable is computed exclusively from the observations of the NO CHOICE treatment in order to identify a player's "type" in situations where it cannot be a¤ected by the preceding choice of the game. More speci…cally, it is an individual's average e¤ort level in all "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment minus the average e¤ort by all players A or B in all "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment (averaged over all sessions, i.e., independent of order and pay rule).
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Dependent variable: choice of alliance formation (v it =1 if choice = "2-1", i = A; B, t = round) Indep. var.
xtlogit (1) xtlogit (2) xtlogit (3) xtlogit (4 Random-e¤ects logistic regression (154 individuals), standard errors in parentheses, ***(**,*) signi…cant at the 1 percent level (5 percent, 10 percent). Observations from rounds 6-15 only (experienced behavior).
Observations from "NO CHOICE …rst; fee for 1-1-1" are taken as the baseline group. "C-NC" and "PAY2-1" are control variables for the di¤erent session types; (x i x A;B )
N C are an individual's average e¤orts in the NO CHOICE treatment (in the "1-1-1" and the "2-1" contests, respectively), compared to the average e¤ort of all players A or B in these contests.
is an individual's average payo¤ in "2-1" contests compared to his average payo¤ in "1-1-1" contests from the NO CHOICE treatment. N C is an individual's average e¤ort in the "2-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment, compared to the average e¤ort of all players A or B in the "2-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment. An individual's average e¤ort in the "2-1" contests is positively correlated with his e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests. However, Estimations (3) and (4) suggest that an individual's e¤ort expended in exogenously formed alliances cannot explain the selection of players into endogenously formed alliances: the coe¢ cient of (x i x A;B )
is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Result 1 a) Individuals who typically expend high e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests are signi…cantly less likely to form an alliance. b) Whether or not an individual typically expends high e¤ort in the "2-1" contests does not signi…cantly in ‡uence the likelihood of alliance formation.
The di¤erence in Result 1 is quite intuitive: While e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests may re ‡ect a subject's desire to win most closely, e¤ort in the "2-1" contests may be a¤ected by additional motivations. These may include solidarity with the fellow alliance partner or in-group favoritism more generally. Such in-group altruism in "2-1" contests might increase the probability of a vote for alliance formation and thus countervail the e¤ect of higher commitment to expend e¤ort.
As a further explanatory variable, Estimation (4) includes the di¤erence between an individual's average payo¤ in the "2-1" contests and in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment. The estimated coe¢ cient of this variable
is positive although only borderline signi…cant (p-value: 0:109): The higher the monetary advantage from playing the "2-1" contest, the more likely it is that a player votes for the "2-1" contest. 30 The results on how a player's commitment to spend e¤ort impacts decisions about alliance formation lead to an important conclusion: Higher e¤orts in voluntarily formed alliances cannot be a result of what could be called a 'direct selection e¤ect'. The increase in e¤orts is not solely caused by players who typically expend high e¤ort in "2-1" contests, selecting themselves into alliances in the CHOICE treatment.
E¤ort of alliance players in "2-1" contests
We now compare alliance players' e¤ort in exogenous and voluntarily formed alliances. 31 Table 2 shows the results of random-e¤ects regressions of x it , the e¤ort of an alliance player i 2 fA; Bg in the "2-1" contest (in round t). All estimations include our main variable of interest, "CHOICE", which is equal to 1 in the CHOICE treatment and equal to 0 in the NO CHOICE treatment; "CHOICE" identi…es whether the observed e¤ort stems from voluntarily or from randomly formed alliances. Moreover, all four regressions include session controls. 32 Estimations (2)- (4) also control for socioeconomic characteristics as obtained from the exit questionnaire. 33 Alliance players expend 9:6 9:7 points more if the alliance emerges endogenously. The coe¢ cient of "CHOICE" is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1%-level and robust throughout all estimations of the full sample (Estimations (1)- (3)) and to controlling for individual-speci…c characteristics. As the summary statistics have already suggested, endogenous alliance formation leads to an increased mobilization of e¤orts. 34 Result 2 Individuals in voluntarily formed alliances contribute signi…cantly more e¤ort than individuals in randomly and exogenously formed alliances.
Note that the higher e¤ort in endogenous alliances is not due to a selection of players, but occurs despite of such selection: High-e¤ort types are more likely to stand alone; accordingly, fewer of them are members of an endogenously formed alliance than of an alliance that is randomly imposed on all players. 35 The e¤ect of higher e¤ort in voluntary alliances outweighs a possible selection e¤ect that tends to operate in the opposite direction. 31 The reported results are again based on experienced behavior (rounds 6-15) and are robust to including observations from all rounds, using a tobit estimation to account for the truncation of e¤ort levels at 0, or estimating a multilevel mixed e¤ects model to control for possible dependence at the level of matching groups. 32 The session dummies included are again "C-NC" indicating that CHOICE was played …rst and "PAY2-1" indicating that the incentivizing payment had to be made for the "2-1" contest. As Table 2 shows, neither the order of the treatments nor the fee to be paid for either of the games has a signi…cant e¤ect on e¤ort choices. 33 As before, the included variables are age, gender, …eld of study, number of siblings, height, and action chosen in an incentivized prisoner's dilemma played at the end of the experiment. None of these signi…canly a¤ect e¤ort levels in our experiment. 34 This result is con…rmed by a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test that compares average alliance e¤ort per matching group across the two phases (25 paired observations in total, p-value: 0:005). Figure B .3 in the appendix provides additional evidence on this treatment e¤ect by showing that the distribution of alliance e¤orts in the CHOICE treatment …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of alliance e¤orts in NO CHOICE. 35 Table 2 shows: the higher individual e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of NO CHOICE, the higher is the individual e¤ort in "2-1" contests (compare the coe¢ cient of (x i x A;B )
), but the lower is the probability to enter into an alliance (compare Table 1 Random-e¤ects regression (154 individuals), standard errors in parentheses, ***(**,*) signi…cant at the 1 percent level (5 percent, 10 percent). Observations from rounds 6-15 only (experienced behavior). "CHOICE" indicates whether the observation stems from a voluntarily formed alliance; "C-NC" and "PAY2-1" are control variables for the di¤erent session types; (x i x A;B )
is an individual's average e¤ort in the "1-1-1"
contests of the NO CHOICE treatment, compared to average e¤ort of all players A or B in these contests.
Observations from "NO CHOICE …rst; fee for 1-1-1" are taken as the baseline group. # Estimation (4) restricts observations in the CHOICE treatment to the subsample where both players A and B voted for alliance formation (i.e., (v it ; v it ) = (1; 1)). Table 2 : Alliance players'e¤ort in the "2-1" contest.
Estimation (3) provides additional information on who reacts most to the endogenous process of alliance formation. Individuals A or B who expend more-than-average e¤ort in exogenously imposed "1-1-1" contests do not only expend more e¤ort overall in "2-1" contests, but they also increase their e¤ort more strongly in the CHOICE treatment: The interaction term of (x i x A;B ) 1 1 1 N C with the dummy "CHOICE" is signi…cantly positive, suggesting that the treatment e¤ect of "CHOICE" is stronger for those players who expend more-than-average e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment. High-e¤ort subjects dislike forming an alliance, but if they end up in an alliance because their co-players want it, they react with strongly increasing their e¤ort.
Result 3 Voluntary alliance formation leads to a stronger e¤ort increase for those individuals who typically expend more-than-average e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests and who typically prefer to stand alone.
As a direct consequence of this result, the treatment e¤ect of "CHOICE" should be smaller when excluding the observations of voluntarily formed alliances where one of the alliance players voted against alliance formation, as done in Estimation (4) . In this restricted sample of observations of unanimously formed alliances, the treatment e¤ect of "CHOICE" becomes smaller (around 4:6 points) but is still signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (at the 5%-level). The fact that e¤ort in unanimously formed alliances is still higher than average e¤ort in exogenously formed alliances (which include the high e¤ort individuals) might be caused by a stronger feeling of in-group altruism in voluntarily formed alliances.
An additional explanation for the positive e¤ect of endogenous alliance formation and, in particular, for the strong reaction of the individuals typically investing a lot is illustrated in Table 3 . Here, average e¤ort of alliance players in CHOICE is separated according to their own and their potential partner's votes on alliance formation, v it and v it respectively. 36 Table 3 shows that alliance members tend to increase their e¤ort when their co-player voted for alliance formation (and presumably is a "low-e¤ort type"): First, individuals who voted for alliance formation (v it = 1) choose higher e¤ort if their co-player also decided to form an alliance than if their co-player voted against alliance formation (59:4 compared to 49:6). Hence, individuals react to their co-player's decision on alliance formation and adjust their e¤ort choices accordingly. Facing a co-player who voted against alliance formation, individuals may anticipate that their fellow alliance member would choose a relatively high e¤ort. This could explain why they expend less own e¤ort if they are in an alliance with such co-players. Second, the highest e¤ort in "2-1" contests is expended by individuals who 87.4 (7.09) 167
Calculated is the average e¤ort of players i=A,B conditional on the own decision v it and the co-player's decision v it on whether to vote for alliance formation (v it =1 if, in round t, i voted for the "2-1" contest).
Observations from rounds 6-15 only. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level). Table 3 : Alliance e¤ort in the "2-1" contests conditional on the choices on alliance formation.
voted against alliance formation but ended up in an alliance because their co-player voted in favor of formation of an alliance (87:4 on average if (v it ; v it ) = (0; 1)).
If individuals who vote against alliance formation end up being in an alliance in the CHOICE treatment, they know that their co-player wanted to form an alliance -which seemingly goes hand-in-hand with lower e¤ort levels. If the individuals are keen on winning and want to maintain their chances of winning, they have to make up for the lower e¤ort of their co-player by increasing their own e¤ort. Therefore, the increase in e¤orts by the individuals who voted against alliance formation can be interpreted as a behavior that accommodates to the co-player's anticipated behavior. Similar strategic reactions to the alliance players'votes in stage 1 can also be found for the out-group player, as we will see in the next section.
Additional results on individual e¤ort choices 3.3.1 E¤ort of stand-alone players in "2-1" contests
In the following, we shortly examine how the (stand-alone) players C react to the higher e¤orts of voluntarily formed alliances. Remember that the roles of the subjects were …xed throughout the experiment. Also recall that players C have no in ‡uence on whether they …ght against an alliance or against two single players. Hence, there is no selection e¤ect for these stand-alone players. Estimating player C's e¤ort choice in parallel to the estimations for the e¤ort of players A and B (from Table 2 ), we …nd that C's e¤ort against voluntarily formed alliances (CHOICE) is 13 points higher than C's e¤ort against exogenously formed alliances; this increase is signi…cant and robust throughout all estimations. 37 (The regression results are in Table A .1 in the appendix.) 38 Stand-alone players knew if the alliance they were facing was voluntarily formed (CHOICE), and they knew the alliance players'individual decisions on whether to form an alliance (there was complete information in the contest stage). If we separate player C's e¤ort choice according to whether one or both of the alliance players voted for alliance formation, we …nd that the stand-alone player's e¤ort is lower (by 14:2 points) when facing an alliance wherein both individuals had voted for alliance formation than when facing an alliance wherein one of the alliance members had voted for the "1-1-1" contest (compare the coe¢ cient of "I (vA;t;vB;t)=(1;1) CHOICE" in Estimation 4 of Table A.1 in the appendix). Again, this behavior can constitute an optimal reply to the anticipated alliance e¤ort which is highest in alliances that contain individuals who actually prefer to …ght on their own.
E¤ort of players A or B in "1-1-1" contests
The experiment also reveals additional …ndings on contest behavior in three-player individual contests (the "1-1-1" contests). While the theory prediction for individual e¤ort is 100, observed e¤ort is considerably higher, in line with previous …ndings. Moreover, average e¤ort of players A and B is higher when the "1-1-1" contest is played as a result of player A and B's choice than when this scenario is randomly selected (155:6 compared to 136:0). 39 This result can be seen as a straightforward selection e¤ect. When players have the choice, those players who typically expend more-than-average e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests are signi…cantly more likely to vote for the stand-alone contest (compare the estimation results in Table 1 ). Just as for the e¤orts in the "2-1" contest, we can separate average e¤ort in the CHOICE treatment according to the individuals'decisions on alliance formation (see Table A .2 in the appendix). For those individuals who actually voted in favor of alliance formation (i.e., if v it = 1), "1-1-1" e¤orts in the CHOICE treatment are lower compared to NO CHOICE 37 Using a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test, however, the di¤erence of player C's e¤ort in the NO CHOICE compared to the CHOICE treatment is insigni…cant (p-value: 0:1742).
38 Those stand-alone players who invest more-than-average e¤ort in "1-1-1" contests in NO CHOICE also invest more e¤ort in the "2-1" contests. Again, individual e¤orts of a player C in "1-1-1" and in "2-1" contests are positively correlated. 39 Estimating e¤ort of players A and B in the "1-1-1" contest similar to the estimations of the e¤ort in "2-1" contests (as in Table 2 ) yields a coe¢ cient of CHOICE of about +17 which is throughout signi…cant at the 1%-level. The p-value of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test testing this di¤erence at the matching group level is 0:0283. Compare also the time series of e¤orts in "1-1-1" contests in Figure B .4 in the appendix.
(114:6 compared to 136:0). For players who voted in favor of the "1-1-1" contest (i.e., if v it = 0), "1-1-1" e¤orts are higher than the average e¤ort in NO CHOICE. 40 While the possibility to choose which contest to play also leads to increased e¤orts in "1-1-1" contests on the aggregate level, this e¤ect is to a large extent caused by a selection of highly competitive individuals into these stand-alone contests.
Conclusion
Our analysis aimed at a better understanding of alliance formation in contests. Why are alliances formed and which factors determine whether an individual prefers to form an alliance or to stand alone? What are the implications of voluntary alliance formation on e¤orts and in-group solidarity? Key insights from our analysis are as follows.
(1) Players who are committed to expending amounts of e¤ort that are much above average are inclined to stand alone. In this respect, our analysis is in line with the behavior of Friedrich Schiller's protagonist Wilhelm Tell: a "strong player" is stronger when standing alone than when he forms an alliance. The …nding is also in line with the rational choice calculus of players who are willing to expend high e¤ort. Players who have a higher subjective valuation of winning the contest anticipate that they will contribute more e¤ort than others and that, in an alliance, other players inside their alliance may free-ride on them. This makes such "strong players" bear a disproportionately high share of the cost of alliance e¤ort; hence, they prefer to stand alone. The other players who are less eager to expend much e¤ort, however, bene…t from this free-riding possibility.
(2) Whether players team up in an alliance on a voluntary basis or are forced to play as members of an alliance is important for their performance in the alliance. On average, players in a voluntary alliance expend more resources than players in a forced alliance. This result is obtained when comparing the e¤orts of players who self-select into an alliance and the e¤orts of players from the full sample who are forced into an alliance. We …nd that this higher e¤ort in voluntary alliances is not a consequence of straightforward selection, but occurs even though there is a selection e¤ect that downward-biases e¤ort in the voluntary alliance. By (1), selection suggests that voluntary alliances are formed by players who expend comparatively little e¤ort, whereas forced alliances consist of an unbiased sample of players. The higher e¤orts in voluntarily formed alliances are in line with results on in-group favoritism in psychology if one assumes that the voluntary association of an alliance has stronger group-formation power than the simple exogenous formation of alliances.
(3) The e¤ect of voluntary alliance formation is largest in alliances that only one of the alliance players voted for. The larger e¤ect arises because those players who voted against alliance formation show a particularly strong reaction to playing in an endogenously formed alliance. In those endogenously formed alliances, a player's vote for or against alliance formation contains information about the individual willingness to expend e¤ort. Consequently, the individuals who voted against alliance formation but end up in an alliance seem to correctly anticipate the lower e¤ort choice of their fellow alliance member who voted for alliance formation; in order to compensate for this low e¤ort and to keep their chances of winning high, they strongly increase their own e¤ort. This high e¤ort, however, is also anticipated by the alliance partners who, in turn, reduce their e¤ort contribution. Similar strategic reactions can be observed on the part of the stand-alone players who, facing voluntarily formed alliances, increase their e¤ort accordingly and who choose particularly high e¤ort when …ghting against an alliance wherein one of the players voted against alliance formation and subsequently chooses high e¤ort.
Overall, we …nd evidence for higher in-group favoritism, causing alliance e¤ort to be higher in voluntarily formed alliances. We also …nd that players who are willing to expend high e¤ort correctly anticipate that they are exploited if in an alliance and prefer to stand alone. These …ndings have important implications for curbing or intensifying competition in contests and tournaments or, more speci…cally, for the design of work structures in labor markets. A contest designer interested in maximizing the total e¤ort expended can best achieve this goal by preventing the formation of teams and letting the individuals interact as single players. However, a substantial share of individuals has shown to have a preference for competing in groups, even if alliance formation implies having to pay a fee. Taking this preference for alliance formation into account, it is advisable to let individuals choose freely whether or not to form groups. It strengthens their willingness to contribute to group success more than if the team structure is imposed on them. This holds despite the fact that voluntary group formation leads to a selection of less win-motivated individuals into the team. Moreover, as individuals understand this selection e¤ect and react to it when choosing their own contribution, a contest designer who wants to elicit high e¤ort choices may prefer to team up "weak" and "strong" individuals: In our experiment, the largest e¤ect on group e¤ort, i.e. the largest increase in contributions, has been observed in the "mixed" alliances where an individual who voted against alliance formation (over)compensated for the low (expected) e¤ort of his co-player (compare Table 3 ; this also holds for total e¤ort of all three players). Therefore, while participant involvement in the procedure of alliance formation leads to stronger in-group solidarity, a procedure that bene…ts such types of mixed group compositions may also be desirable when designing tournament environments.
A Appendix

A.1 Equilibrium analysis
The "1-1-1" contest. In the "1-1-1" contest, each player i 2 fA; B; Cg chooses a nonnegative e¤ort x i ; the choices are made simultaneously and independently. The vector of e¤ort choices (x A ; x B ; x C ) determines i's expected payo¤ as
Here, p i constitutes the probability that player i 2 fA; B; Cg wins the contest, in which case he is attributed a prize of value V . With probability 1 p i player i does not win, and is attributed a prize of value zero. Independently of winning or losing the contest, player i has to bear the cost of his own e¤ort x i , which is assumed to be equal to the e¤ort itself (hence equal to x i ). Player i's probability of winning is
and p i = 1=3 if all three contestants expend zero e¤ort. 41 The Nash equilibrium of this contest is known to be unique and characterized by e¤ort choices 
The "2-1" contest. In the "2-1" contest, players A and B are in alliance and compete against player C. As in "1-1-1", each player i 2 fA; B; Cg chooses a nonnegative e¤ort x i , and all players choose their e¤ort independently and simultaneously. The vector of action choices (x A ; x B ; x C ) determines individual expected payo¤ as
This contest success function is used in many areas of economics, including marketing, rent-seeking, military con ‡ict and sports competition. It has several axiomatic and microeconomic underpinnings. where the probability p AB that the alliance of A and B wins is de…ned as
if x A + x B + x C > 0 and p AB = 1=2 otherwise. If the alliance wins, players A and B receive equal shares of the prize V ; if player C wins, he gets the full prize V . All losers get zero. By (3), the alliance's probability of winning depends on the sum of alliance members'e¤orts and not on the composition of x A + x B ; alliance members' e¤orts are perfect substitutes when determining the alliance's win probability. Nitzan (1991) showed that the equilibrium of this "2-1" contest is characterized by e¤ort choices
and equilibrium payo¤s
As the marginal cost of e¤ort is constant and p AB depends on the sum of x A and x B , only the sum of alliance players'e¤orts is uniquely determined in equilibrium.
42
A comparison of (2) and (5) shows that the sum of the expected payo¤s of A and B is the same in the "2-1" contest as in the "1-1-1" contest; the expected payo¤ of player C, however, is higher in the "2-1" contest.
A.2 E¤ort of stand-alone players in "2-1" contests Note: Random-e¤ects regression (77 individuals), standard errors in parentheses, ***(**,*) signi…cant at the 1 percent level (5 percent, 10 percent). Observations from rounds 6-15 only (experienced behavior). "CHOICE" indicates whether the observation stems from a contest against a voluntarily formed alliance; "C-NC" and "PAY2-1" are control variables for the di¤erent session types; (x i x C )
is an individual's average e¤ort in the "1-1-1" contests of the NO CHOICE treatment, compared to average e¤ort of all players C in these contests. The dummy variable I (v A;t ;v B;t )=(1;1) indicates whether both alliance players had voted for alliance formation. Observations from "NO CHOICE …rst; fee for 1-1-1" are taken as the baseline group. This table summarizes average e¤ort of alliance players in "2-1" contests, depending on the order in which the two treatments NO CHOICE and CHOICE were played. For observations from part 1 (that is, comparing treatments that were played …rst in the respective session), e¤ort in CHOICE (if played …rst) is on average 10:3 points higher than in NO CHOICE (if played …rst). Looking only at observations from part 2, e¤orts in CHOICE (if played second) are on average 10:5 points higher than in NO CHOICE (if played second). Finally, in both treatments, average e¤orts are consistently around 6:5 points lower in part 2 than in part 1, due to learning e¤ects. Welcome! Please read these instructions carefully and completely. Properly understanding them will help you to make better decisions and, hence, to earn more money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Tokens. At the end of the experiment we will convert the Tokens you have earned to cash and pay you in private. For each 45 Tokens you earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. In addition to the Tokens earned during the experiment, each participant will receive a show-up-fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be asked to leave the laboratory without getting paid. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand and we will help you.
1. Your task Before beginning this experiment you will answer a quiz on your computer screen.
It contains questions regarding situations which might occur during the experiment. Consulting these instructions will help you to answer them.
The experiment consists of three parts. These parts are independent from each other; your decisions in one part have no in ‡uence on the other parts.
For the experiment, groups consisting of three people are formed. The experiment will be repeated several times. The participants in your group will usually vary each period, since the groups are randomly composed in each period.
Your task in each period is to make an e¤ort decision. The money you earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the other players in your group. Let the three players in one group be called A, B and C. In each period, three players A, B and C compete for a prize of 450 Tokens.
The competition works through two options. These are called "Single" and "Alliance".
You will play both options during this experiment.
Following the quiz you will be able to try out both options in a trial period. The monitor will show you in each period which option is at hand.
The rules of both options are as follows:
Option "Single": The computer designates each player his role (A, B or C). All players will simultaneously choose their respective e¤ort in Tokens. The e¤ort a¤ects the probability of winning the prize. Every player can choose any number of Tokens as e¤ort. Tokens are not divisible, so you can only choose whole numbers, such as 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . You will have to pay this amount of Tokens to the lab, whether or not you win the competition.
When all players have chosen their e¤orts, a fortune wheel will decide who will win the prize of 450 Tokens. The fortune wheel is divided into three colors: blue, green and purple. Blue represents the Tokens A has bet. Green represents the amount B has chosen, and purple C's amount.
The fractions of the colors on the fortune wheel correspond exactly to the proportion of the respective e¤orts to the total e¤ort of all three players together.
All e¤orts of your group, and therefore the probability of each player to win the prize, will be presented to you for your information.
At the center of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the top. Therefore, each player's probability of winning depends not only on his own expenditure in the competition but also on the expenditures of the other players in the group.
Note that the more Tokens a player spends, the more likely it is that he wins the competition.
More e¤ort expended, however, also means that a player has to pay more Tokens to the lab.
If none of the players expend any Tokens, then it is equally likely (probability of 1/3rd) that A, or B or C wins.
As soon as at least one Token is bet, the above given formula for the probability of winning holds. If two players do not expend any Tokens, but the third player (e.g. B) expends at least one Token, the third player (i.e. B) wins the competition.
Every player has to pay his e¤ort (in Tokens) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome of the fortune wheel.
Therefore, your earnings per period will be calculated as your prize in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings = prize -e¤ort.
The winning player gets the prize of 450 Token and the losing players get nothing. The winning player's earnings = 450 -own e¤ort, while the losing players have to pay their e¤orts to the lab and don't get any winnings.
Note: Should you bet more Tokens in a period than you can actually win, you will certainly make a loss.
The payment will only take place at the end of the entire experiment.
Option "Alliance": The two players A and B form an alliance. Player C is playing on his B.5 own.
Your role in the experiment, either A, B or C, will be randomly assigned to you. Each participant will keep his role throughout the entire experiment.
All players will simultaneously choose an e¤ort (whole number), which they would like to bet.
Each player decides independently on his e¤ort. A player's e¤ort can be any number of Tokens, which he will have to pay to the lab whether or not he wins the competition.
Players A and B have to pay 5 Tokens for every period they play in an "Alliance".
After the individual decisions have been made, a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether the alliance consisting of players A and B or player C wins the 450-Token-prize. As you will see, the fortune wheel is divided into two colors -turquoise and purple. The turquoise color represents Therefore, each player's probability of winning depends not only on his own expenditure in the competition but also on the expenditures of the other players in the group.
If none of the players expend any Tokens then it is equally likely that the alliance consisting of players A and B or that player C wins.
As soon as at least one Token is bet, the above given formulas for the probability of winning hold.
Every player has to pay his e¤ort (in Tokens) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per period will be calculated as your prize in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings = prize -e¤ort. Note: Should you bet more Tokens in a period than you can actually win, you will certainly make a loss.
B.6
2. Procedure The experiment will consist of 15 periods. In each period, you will have the same role (player A, B or C). The other two players in your group will be randomly assigned to you in each period.
Player C always plays alone. Players A and B either play alone or in an alliance, depending on the game option (Single or Alliance). The two players in your group will be randomly assigned to you in each period. You will not know who the other players in your group are. Any attempt to reveal your identity to anyone is prohibited.
At the end of today's experiment, we will randomly choose 3 periods out of 15; your total earnings in those 3 periods will be added up, converted to Euros and paid to you in cash. This means that the earnings of all other 12 periods will not be paid to you and that you do not have to pay your e¤orts from those periods either. You will get to know which 3 out of the 15 periods will be chosen only at the end of this experiment. In addition, you will receive 0.60 Euros for each of the 15 periods.
You will receive information about the second and third parts of the experiment on your screen.
After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender, age, major...). All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly con…dential.
We will begin now with the quiz, after which you will have the opportunity to try playing one Single and one Alliance game. We would like to thank you in advance for participating and wish you good luck! ************************* Part 2 2 This part will consist of 15 periods.
In each period, players A and B will vote on whether they would like to play option Single or option Alliance.
If player A and player B both choose Single, option Single will be played.
If player A and player B both choose Alliance, option Alliance will be played.
If each option receives one vote, there will be a random draw. The options are then chosen with equal probability.
